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Voter turnout rates for Canadian federal elections have been in decline for over 50 years, 
and currently Canada is ranked 18th among OECD countries in this regard. To what 
extent do certain socioeconomic factors have in encouraging or discouraging voters’ 
participation in elections in Canada? 
This study examines previous literature on theories related to the ties between political 
participation and socioeconomic inequality; including the law of dispersion, relative 
power theory, conflict theory, and resource theory. Compiling data from external sources 
and creating a pseudo panel specific to this study, these theories are then tested to 
examine how income inequality (measured through Gini index, P90/P50 and P50/P10 
ratios, and median income), age, marital status, and employment rates has effected voter 
turnout in Canada between 1979 and 2015. The analysis shows that the effects of both 
income inequality and the employment rate on turnout exhibit non-linear quadratic 
characteristics. Further to that, age and marital status are also shown to have positive 
effects on voter turnout. Employment rates specific to education are also examined but 
deemed generally inconclusive, however further insight and stronger data could yield 











It is no secret that voter turnout is on a slow and steady downward trend in Canada 
since the mid-60s. In fact, of the ten lowest recorded turnouts, eight of them have been 
the last eight consecutive federal elections held since 1993.1 This is not solely a Canadian 
electoral issue though as voter turnout in many Western democracies lie below 70 
percent. In data presented by the Pew Research Center, of the last 35 elections held in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Canada’s 
68.3 percent in 2015 would rank 18th; and Canada’s closest neighbour, the United States 
ranked 27th based on 2012’s turnout of 53.6 percent.2 In contrast, eight OECD countries; 
Australia, Luxembourg, Iceland, Denmark, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, and Belgium 
(the last two noted as having compulsory voting in place at last elections analyzed) 
achieved turnout higher than 80 percent.  
Much has been researched and written about the motivation for citizens to participate 
in voting and about the potential consequences when the representation at the polls is less 
than full participation. Two competing theories that set out to explain how voters 
rationalize their decision on whether to vote or not come down to whether voter’s see the 
act of voting as an investment or as consumption (Guttman et al., 1994). An investment 
theory approach assumes that the voter is looking at their potential long-term gains from 
their supported candidate being elected over the other candidate(s) and weighing it 








theory approach assumes that the voter finds the act of voting itself is at least part of the 
benefit. These theories along with theories that explore how socioeconomic inequalities 
may affect political participation will be explored further in the next section of this paper. 
Sub-optimal voter turnout rates would be of less concern if we could say that all 
groups of citizens are still equally represented in the voter base that cast ballots in the 
most recent election. For that to be the case, you would need evidence showing that the 
factors involved in voter participation are completely random, and are not dependent 
upon socioeconomic factors. This perspective follows the law of dispersion, as first 
hypothesized by Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten in the 1930s. Essentially, 
Tingsten’s theory is that voter turnout rates and political inequality are inversely related 
so that as voter turnout declines, the degree of political inequality present in the election 
results increases (Tingsten, 1937). This theory, and its potential implications if true, will 
be explored and tested in the following sections of this paper.  
The goal of any democratic system should be to produce the best result that is truest to 
the ‘will of the people’, and any result below 100 percent turnout is technically a sample 
of the preferred choice of the electorate. For democracies like Canada, which continually 
achieve voter turnout rates between high-50 and high-60 percentile, it leaves 30-40 
percent of the electorate unrepresented. This would not be an issue if we could say with 
confidence that this sample of the electorate satisfied the same criteria of samples that 
produce inferences made on populations through the method of statistics but this is 
obviously not the case in the situation of a free-willed election. Whether you ascribe to 
investment theory or consumption theory as it pertains to voter choice, the one 
fundamental fact they have in common is that in either case the potential voter is 
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engaging in a decision and the outcome of whether they vote or not is not random, but a 
subjective action. For this reason, it is imperative that we undertake an investigation into 
issues pertaining to why electors fail to cast a vote, if inequality factors related to the law 
of dispersion are present, and how the inefficiencies of society could be contributing to 
creating gaps in equality for all citizens. Building on the foundation of rational choice 
models of voter behaviour, and a literature suggesting that political inequality becomes 
greater as voter turnout declines; there are three discernable objectives of this paper. First, 
try to develop potential models that may give insight into whether the law of dispersion is 
present or not in Canadian federal elections. Second, examine and try to explain which 
theories pertaining to socioeconomic inequalities and political participation may be most 
accurate to describe the Canadian political landscape. Finally, to raise the profile of the 
issue of how socioeconomic class differences affect the greater electorate and political 
outcomes to spurn further discussion and study. 
This paper proceeds as follows: first, by providing a brief historical background of 
Canada’s democratic system, and how it ranks internationally in terms of voter turnout. 
This is followed by a literature review of theories of rational choice of voters, Herbert 
Tingsten’s law of dispersion, and the relationship between socioeconomic inequalities 
and political participation. I will then describe data obtained from Statistics Canada and 
Elections Canada that was used to create a pseudo panel data set specific to this paper. 
Following this, I will detail the variables chosen to be tested and the construction of the 
statistical models. Subsequently, results from the regression analysis are presented which 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Canadian Democracy Historical Context 
The ability to vote since the Canadian Confederation in 1867 has followed a path 
from being considered a privilege to where it is now a right for all Canadian citizens. 
Aside from being dependent on your gender and ethnicity, minimum requirements to 
being allowed to vote used to depend on your annual income level and the value of the 
property you owned or were a tenant of. Towards the end of the 19th century, these same 
voting rights for women property owners were slowly allowed at the provincial level, a 
movement which progressed towards and culminated with the first federal election of 
universal franchise for majority status men and women in 1921.3 It was not until 1960 
however that universal suffrage was achieved for all Canadian citizens as language in 
Canada’s electoral laws that enabled racial and religious discrimination in voter 
qualification had been amended or removed.4 Expanding voter’s rights and eliminating 
these discriminatory practices has been a strong step forward for Canadian democracy in 
the 20th century but it is now facing new challenges in the area of political participation 
through voter turnout. 
If those first two federal elections under universal suffrage in 1962 and 1963 (each of 
which saw voter turnout rates above 79%), are to be seen as a high point for Canadian 
democratic participation, then the trend since then could be a cause for concern. As seen 






decline in participation. In federal elections held between 1979 and 2015 (including the 
1992 referendum), the mean voter turnout rate was 67.6 percent (see Appendix). 
Figure	1:	Canadian	National	Average	of	Federal	Election	Voter	Turnout	1962-2015	
 
Source: Elections Canada 
The most recent Canadian federal election voter turnout rate of 68.3 percent would be 
in line with the mean average for the past three and a half decades and would also be in 
line with the current average among OECD countries. However, many other democratic 
nations in OECD are performing much better in this area. Based on the latest national 
election data available, OECD ranks the top five countries by voter turnout (as percentage 
of registered voters) as follows: 5 
• Australia 93.2 % 
• Luxembourg 91.2% 





























• Denmark 85.9% 
• Sweden 85.8% 
When comparing Canada’s more recent voter turnout rates to those countries near the 
top it is obvious that there is still some room to grow in order to increase political 
participation for Canadian citizens, and with the backdrop of the ongoing discussions 
centred around the possibility of electoral reform at some point in the not too distant 
future,6 the time is right to add to the discussion of what factors may be encouraging or 
depressing political participation and what implications lower voter turnouts have for 
society. 
2.2 Rational Choice Theories: The Voter’s Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Economists have been trying to understand the ‘paradox of voting’ since early game 
theory was used to examine voter behaviour. Many economists would make the argument 
that it is completely irrational to vote in most elections, and especially federal elections 
due to the fact that the probability of each voter’s single vote being influential in the 
outcome is essentially zero.7 The classical argument being that, when you think like an 
economist, you only take action when the perceived benefits outweigh the costs and under 
these assumptions, the essentially zero probability that your particular vote will matter 
brings the benefits to zero. This is represented in the original rational choice model: 






Where ‘R’ represents the rewards to voting, ‘P’ is the probability of the supported 
candidate winning due to your vote, ‘B’ represents the perceived net benefits of your 
supported candidate winning of the other(s), and ‘C’ would be the costs incurred in the 
voting process (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). This model has been explored and expanded 
in recent years and has seemingly split to provide two alternative hypotheses where 
voting is looked at as an investment or a consumption (Guttman, et al., 1994). According 
to Guttman, et al., voting could be seen as either an act of investment or of consumption, 
and that differentiating between two likely reasons for not voting, “alienation” and 
“indifference” to the candidates or parties, would provide insight into whether voters saw 
their actions as relevant to consumption or investment. It was further reasoned that if 
abstention occurred due to voters feeling alienated then it was a sign that they viewed the 
act of voting as a consumption, and if they abstained due to indifference then it was a sign 
that they viewed it as investment. Using panel survey data from the 1976 U.S. 
Presidential election they used the theoretical models presented below to try and provide 
statistical evidence for whether voting abstention had been linked to attitudes of 
alienation or indifference from candidates.   
1. EU(abstain) = p’u1 + (1-p’)u2 
2. EU(vote) = pu1 + (1-p)u2 
Where EU is the voter’s expected utility derived from either voting or abstaining: p is the 
voter’s subjective idea on probability of favoured party winning, and thus p’ is subjective 
probability of favoured party not winning: u1 is voter utility from favoured party 




∆EU = (p-p’)(u1-u2) 
representing the difference in utility from voting rather than abstaining. Using this 
method, Guttman, et al. had strong enough evidence to conclude that voter abstention was 
due more so as a result of alienation and not indifference, thus providing significant 
support behind the consumption theory of voting than the investment theory.  
The common theme in these widely popular models presented is that to at least some 
degree, the voter’s decision to take the action of voting is centred around having a 
preferred candidate available to them to vote for and that there is some rough estimation 
on a personal level as to their chance of winning. Where the models fall short in this 
regard though is that they assume that there is a preferred candidate available at all times 
and thus the decision then comes down to the likelihood of winning alone. But for many 
voters, it is very possible that, since voters do not control the candidates available to them 
since it is candidates who decide to run and then present themselves to voters, there is no 
preferred candidate as all available candidates may be indistinguishable to a given voter 
based on things such as their life experiences, political ideologies, the communities they 
identify with, and so on. If there are no preferred candidates, then in either a model with 
an investment approach or a model with a consumption approach, the rewards to voting 
become either 0 or less than 0. But if this is the case, that some voters find the candidates 
available to them indistinguishable from each other for whatever reasons they feel, it is 
important to study how this will this affect election outcomes, and then the policy set in 
place by these governments. If voters who withdrew from elections did so randomly from 
all classes across demographics, then you could argue that the effect would be minimal or 
nil since the representation of all classes would still be there in proportion to each other. 
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However, there is evidence to suggest that this does not happen and	that	effects	of	
Tingsten’s	law	of	dispersion	are	real	across	a	variety	of	societies.	
2.3 Law of Dispersion 
In his 1996 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, 
political scientist Arend Lijphart summarized why low voter turnout creates democratic 
problems through five key reasons:   
(1) It means unequal turnout thatis systematically biased against less well-to-do 
citizens. (2) Unequal turnout spells unequal political influence. (3) U.S. voter 
turnout is especially low, but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is 
also relatively low in most other countries. (4) Turnout in midterm, regional, 
local, and supranational elections-less salient but by no means unimportant 
elections-tends to be especially poor. (5) Turnout appears to be declining 
everywhere. 
All of the evidence brought forth by Lijphart in his address could be used as support 
for Tingsten’s theory. Lijphart points to a study by Steven Rosentone and John Hansen, 
which shows that the smaller the size of the turnout of participants, the greater the depth 
of socioeconomic inequality between participants. The study found that in the United 
States between 1960 and 1988, as turnout declined, class inequalities increased. Gaps in 
participation have been found to grow in both conventional (financial contributions, 
volunteering with election offices, etc.) and unconventional (boycotts, tax strikes, etc.) 
means of political engagement, favouring those citizens with a greater level of advantage 
over others (Lijphart, 1997). Lijphart’s address accepts the law of dispersion as 
undisputed fact and acts more as a call to action on reversing its effects in order to 
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improve democratic systems than trying to validate the law itself. We can use Lijphart’s 
message as motivation for understanding the context of how the law of dispersion affects 
our political outcomes, but other sources which have tested for the presence of the law 
need to be consulted. 
Perhaps the most relevant and recent study with respect to the presence of the law of 
dispersion took place in Sweden over back-to-back elections held in 2010 and 2011, 
conducted by Mikael Persson, Maria Solevid, and Richard Öhrvall. In 2010, Västra 
Götaland county council (comprised of 149 seats, making it the second largest parliament 
in Sweden) held an election simultaneously with national and local jurisdictions, but soon 
after found concerning irregularities at the county level. This resulted in having to do the 
county’s election over again in 2011. Due to the low salience of the 2011 election, the 
voter turnout for the second election dropped from 80.6 percent in 2010 to 44.1 percent in 
2011. Under these conditions, using multiple survey sources of the electorate, a natural 
experiment was conducted to test the whether this drop off in turnout saw certain 
socioeconomic groups drop off disproportionately in comparison to others. Results from 
their regression analysis show that in the election with lower turnout, the effects of the 
factors Age, Income, Years of Education, Political Interest, Married or Unmarried all 
become significant predictors of voter turnout. The participation gap between 70-year 
olds and 18-year olds increased from 6 percentage points to 28 percentage points and the 
regression analysis found a statistically significant relationship between age and voter 
turnout. The participation gap between those designated “rich” and those “poor” by the 
study grew from 15 percentage points to 20 percentage points and the regression analysis 
also found a statistically significant result in household incomes relationship to voter 
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turnout. The participation gap between those with seven years of schooling compared to 
those with sixteen years of schooling grew from 19 percentage points to 32 percentage 
points, and again the regression analysis found a statistically significant relationship 
between education in years and voter turnout. 
The strongest of predictors in the Västra Götaland county study was found to be the 
stated level of political interest held by the survey respondents (Persson et al., 2013). For 
the 2010 election, the predicted probability of those with lower interest in politics was 
found to be 83 percent. That is, if you had responded to one of the surveys as saying you 
had little to no interest in regional politics you still had an 83 percent probability of 
turning up to vote. For the 2011 election, that probability of voting fell to 36 percent, 
representing a decrease of 47 percentage points. For those with higher stated interest in 
politics, the decrease was only from 99 percent probability to 80 percent probability of 
voting. This connection seems almost too intuitive and should come as common sense to 
witness of the issue. The greater question of the matter though is not how likely it is that 
those already interested in politics will choose to participate, but what are the factors 
leading to political interest or deterring those from being interested in politics, and to 
what extent are they represented in the socioeconomic factors already being tested as 
variables in studies like Persson’s. 
The idea of the law of dispersion in this context raises many questions when it comes 
to analyzing the success of any democratic system. If we believe the law to be true, to 
what extent are its effects universal or culturally or regionally centred? Are there other 
mitigating factors that can amplify or reduce its effects? In the previous section the 
theoretical approach to the elements of a voter’s decision to engage through a cost-benefit 
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analysis framework was explored. In the following section, theories that aim to address 
how inequalities in society can affect that process will be presented. These theories could 
be useful in explaining how it is that the law of dispersion comes into effect. 
2.4 Relevant Theories on Income Inequality and Political Engagement 
There are three competing theories that attempt to explain the relationship between 
income inequality and political engagement: the relative power theory, conflict theory, 
and resource theory (Solt, 2008).  When applied to this case, the relative power theory 
supposes that economic inequality will enforce a negative impact on political engagement 
due to how power is distributed throughout society. From an economics perspective, 
consider the case where you are competing for a scarce commodity with another party 
within a market. It is rational for each party in the market to seek out information on each 
other and understand the degree of wealth or whatever other measure of capability of 
acquiring this commodity over you. Therefore, the richer the other agent(s) are in relation 
to you, the worse off you will be since you have a lower market power and are less 
capable of outbidding others for the commodity (Goodin & Dryzek 1980). Goodin and 
Dryzek go on to support applying this logic to political outcomes since policy outputs 
have a limited or fixed quantity and therefore those with the relatively higher ability to 
influence the policy makers are in a greater position to influence. In other words, absolute 
levels of wealth are irrelevant in assessing one’s potential political influence. If the 
absolute levels of wealth rise for all parties involved at an equal rate, it is their relative 
positions to one another that will determine who has the greater influence. Further to that, 
as pointed out by Solt, this framework allows the wealthier to influence political 
behaviour in their favour before an issue can be debated publicly. This process then 
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convinces those poorer individuals to withdraw from the process altogether as they are 
continually unable to prevail in influencing policies and therefore find no real gains 
through the political system. This could be looked upon as another way of showing how 
voters can become alienated and thus political interest declines. 
In contrast to the relative power theory, conflict theory supposes that as economic 
inequality increases, it should motivate voters who are losing power to become more 
politically engaged (Solt, 2008). As Solt notes in their research, the theory maintains that 
as political preferences diverge there is greater opportunity present for debate. It is 
through the higher frequency and polarization of debate that then mobilizes those who 
would not become engaged if political discourse and debate were not so divergent. 
Through conflict theory, those who are poorer become mobilized and increase their 
engagement as they are becoming poorer relative to the other citizens and thus, 
redistributive policies should become more attractive to them as they become poorer. On 
the opposite end of the spectrum, as inequality rises, the richer have more to lose through 
redistributive policies than when inequality is lower. Therefore, an increase in inequality 
should also motivate richer citizens to become politically engaged to protect the income 
levels and luxuries they are currently receiving (Meltzer & Richard 1981). Due to the 
cause for mobilization on both ends of the income spectrum, the conflict theory argues for 
a positive relationship between income inequality and political engagement. 
While relative power theory argues for a negative relationship between income 
inequality and political engagement, and conflict theory argues for a positive relationship; 
the resource theory argues that the relationship is determined at the individual level and is 
thus not as broadly defined as the previous two theories. The main assumption of the 
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resource theory is that to be engaged in politics takes resources and therefore their 
decision about engaging in politics enters the same process as deciding upon whether or 
not to consume a good. Under this assumption, individuals are only going to become 
politically engaged if they are willing to pay the costs (financial or otherwise) to do so 
and having a higher income decreases the consequences of these costs. The prevailing 
argument of the theory is thus that greater inequality is expected to decrease political 
engagement for the relatively poorer, and increase political engagement among the 
relatively richer. Therefore, the relationship between income inequality and political 
engagement plays out differently depending on the individual (Jaime-Castillo, 2009). 
Since income inequality is represented by the degree to which aggregate income is 
skewed in favour of a few over the many, you would expect that if the resource theory is 
relevant, the higher the inequality, the greater the number of citizens who do not have the 
resources to participate and thus a decrease in aggregate political engagement. 
2.5 Contribution to the Literature 
When we talk about ways to create a more equal society the discussion is often leaves 
out the political system altogether. The aspect of government and its representation of the 
‘will of the people’ is treated as a fixed entity, and under this assumption we try and 
create solutions that will achieve outcomes such as decreasing income inequality and 
incarceration rates, provide better access to education and health care for all income 
classes, and eliminate the gender wage gap and poverty. But having the discussion on 
decreasing inequalities in this way is leaving out perhaps the most vital aspect necessary 
to achieve these goals, and that is, if voting is creating bias in political representation, 
how do we distribute power more equally to eliminate these biases? There are many 
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theories and ideas out there on how to tackle that question and answering is not the goal 
of this paper, but instead the contribution of this paper would be addressing the initial 
question that precedes it. The aim of this paper is therefore to examine and build on the 
literature that is looking to examine how various socioeconomic factors, specifically 
income inequality, affect aggregate political participation.  
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
This paper is examining the argument that political participation is determined by 
various socioeconomic factors, most notably of which is income inequality. Data was 
collected from two main data sources, Elections Canada and Statistics Canada to test this 
argument on the Canadian provinces specifically for only federal elections. A pseudo 
panel was constructed for this paper from cross-sectional sample data estimates over the 
period of time from 1979 to 2015. Using these data estimates from Statistics Canada, as 
well as post-election estimates on voter turnout from Elections Canada made it possible to 
create an appropriate panel dataset to apply to the models that were tested which will be 
explained in the next section. After the pseudo panel was constructed, various models 
were regressed using the fixed-effects method. The fixed-effects method was chosen in 
order to control for the issue of unobserved heterogeneity that would be a present constant 
over time when cross-examining these factors across provinces over time. The models 
themselves will be explained in more detail in the next section of the paper, after the data 





3.1 Statistics Canada 
Statistics Canada is Canada’s national statistics agency. Statistics Canada is 
responsible for conducting the national census of the population every five years in 
addition to various other surveys of which there are currently 350 active. In total, five 
Statistics Canada cross-sectional data tables estimated from four different surveys 
(Survey of Consumer Finances, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, Canadian 
Income Survey, and Labour Force Survey) as well as the census of the population 
completed every five years were accessed in order to compile data used in the pseudo 
panel for this paper and they are summarized as follows. 
3.1.1 Table 206-0033: Gini coefficients of adjusted market, total and after-tax 
income, Canada and provinces. 
This table provided by Statistics Canada estimates the annual Gini coefficient in 
Canada on an annual basis within the timeframe of 1976 to 2014. The estimates are done 
at the national level as well as at the provincial level. The data used for the table was 
prepared by the Income Statistics Division of Statistics Canada and bases its estimates 
primarily off of the following surveys:8 
Survey of Consumer Finances (1976-1997): An annual voluntary survey that targeted 
all individuals in Canada, excluding residents living in Territories, within institutions, and 
living on First Nations reserves. According to Statistics Canada, these exclusions 
amounted to less than three present of the total population. The subjects to which the 





spending, and wealth; and low income and inequality. Starting in 1986, estimates from 
the survey were then revised following the results of the applicable census data.9 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993-2012): An annual voluntary survey 
that targeted all individuals in Canada, excluding residents living in Territories, within 
institutions, and living on First Nations reserves. The survey is the primary source for 
Canadian income data and is used to provide additional information to Canada’s Labour 
Force Survey. The sample for the survey consists of two panels which at any given time 
covers approximately 17,000 households. Each panel selected stays in the survey for six 
consecutive years with a new panel being introduced every three years, creating overlap 
between selected groups. The targeted subjects of the survey are: Families, households 
and housing; Household, family and personal income; Income, pensions, spending and 
wealth; Labour; Low income and inequality.10 
Canadian Income Survey (2012 – 2014): Administered to a sub-sample of 
respondents to the Labour Force Survey. Response to the survey was voluntary and the 
sample consisted of four rotation group each consisting of approximately 8400 










as well as tax data, providing information on income, income sources, and characteristics 
of individuals and households. The survey had a response rate of 70.1%.11 
It should be noted that from 1993 to 1997, both the Survey of Consumer Finances and 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics were used together. Starting with data from 
1993 up to current estimates, a data quality indicator was provided by Statistics Canada 
based on the following scale:12 
- A - Excellent (CV between 0% and 2%);  
- B - Very good (CV between 2% and 4%);  
- C - Good (CV between 4% and 8%);  
- D - Acceptable (CV between 8% and 16%);  
- E - Use with caution (1976 to 1992: CV greater than or equal to 16%; 
1993 and subsequent years: CV between 16% and 33.3%). 
Of the 80 observations used that were graded by Statistics Canada in this manner, 24 were 
ranked A, 53 were ranked B, and 3 were ranked C.  
3.1.2 Table 206-0032: Upper income limit, income share and average of 
adjusted market, total and after-tax income by income decile, Canada and 
provinces 
This table’s contributions are its average after-tax income estimates by income decile 
for each province. By using these estimates, income decile ratio variables were created in 
the pseudo panel, for the purpose of being used as another measure of income inequality 
as an alternative to the Gini coefficient. Similar to Table 206-0033, the estimates by 








Survey of Consumer Finances, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, and Canadian 
Income Survey and collectively covered the same time frame of 1976 to 2014.13 
3.1.3 Table 206-0052 Income of individuals by age group, sex, and income 
source, Canada, provinces and selected census metropolitan areas 
The contribution to the pseudo panel data from this table is the median income of the 
population sixteen years of age or older on an annual basis from 1979 to 2014 by 
province using 2014 constant dollars. The estimates in this Table were also compiled 
using the Survey of Consumers Finances, Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, and 
Canadian Income Survey.14 
3.1.4 Table 051-0001 Estimates of population, by age group and sex for July 1, 
Canada, provinces and territories 
The contribution to the pseudo panel data from this table is the median age on an 
annual basis from 1979 to 2014 for each province. Estimates for the population in this 
table come from results of the population census.15 
3.1.5 Table 051-0042 Estimates of population, by marital status or legal marital 











The contribution to the pseudo panel data from this table are the figures related to 
marital status for each province on an annual basis from 1979 to 2015. Data from this 
table allowed for the calculation of the estimated proportion of the population that was 
either legally married or in a common-law relationship. The data originally used to 
construct the Statistics Canada table is composed of data primarily collected from various 
censuses but also from other Statistics Canada surveys, and administrative data such as 
that held by the Canadian Revenue Agency.16 
3.1.6 Table 282-0004 Labour Force Survey Estimates, by educational 
attainment, sex and age group 
The contribution to the pseudo panel data from this table is the employment rate at the 
provincial level from 1992 to 2015. The total employment rate for the population 15 years 
of age and over, as well as the employment rate grouped by highest educational 
attainment (did not graduate high school, high school graduate, diploma or certificate 
holder, Bachelor’s degree or higher) were collected from this table. The estimates in the 
Statistics Canada table were determined from Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey. 
Labour Force Survey: Data from this monthly survey is collected directly from 
respondents and their response is mandatory. The subjects of the survey are as follows: 
Employment and unemployment, Hours of work and work arrangements, Industries, 
Labour, Occupations, Unionization and industrial relations, and Wages, salaries and other 







do not live in an institutionalized setting, are not living on First Nations reserves, are not 
full-time members of the Canadian Armed Forces, do not live in extremely remote areas 
of low population density, and comes from all provinces and territories. The sample size 
for the LFS is approximately 56,000 households, covering roughly 100,000 individuals.17 
3.2 Elections Canada 
Elections Canada is an independent, non-partisan agency of Canada’s Parliament and 
is primarily tasked with the administrating of Canadian elections. It is through Elections 
Canada that all federal elections take place. Some of the most critical aspects of Canada’s 
democratic system that Elections Canada is responsible for is that it administers electoral 
legislation, registers political parties, maintains the National Register of Electors, and 
provides access for all eligible citizens to the voting process.18 
Information on voter turnout rates at both the national and provincial levels in 
Canada’s federal election history was provided by Elections Canada. Since this paper is 
examining how socioeconomic factors, specifically income inequality, affects political 
participation in Canada, voter turnout rates (as a measure for political participation) is 
necessary for the pseudo panel created as it will be the dependent variable in the models 
being tested. Voter turnout rates are listed in Table 2 in the appendix of Elections 










reflect first-hand information of the proportion of the registered electors population that 
cast a ballot in each respective election. 
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Voter Turnout Rate  
Acting as our dependent variable, the voter turnout rate measures the proportion of 
voters on the registered list of electors who voted in a given election. It is often used as an 
indicator of how healthy and engaged an electoral base is of a given country, region, or 
institution. The higher the voter turnout rate is, the greater the degree of political 
participation amongst those citizens eligible to vote in an election. A low voter turnout 
rate would indicate a large number of legally eligible voters choosing to abstain from the 
process altogether rather than participating and being part of the group of citizens who 
determine the government’s elected officials.  
Table	1:	National	level	voter	turnout	summary	(1979-2015)	
Election Year Voter 
Turnout 
Rate % 
Change in Voter Turnout Difference from 
Mean Average 
1979 76 -- 8.4 
1980 69 -7 1.4 
1984 75 6 7.4 
1988 75 0 7.4 
1992* 72 -3 4.4 
1993 70 -2 2.4 
1997 67 -3 -0.6 
2000 61 -6 -6.6 
2004 61 0 -6.6 
2006 65 4 -2.6 
2008 59 -6 -8.6 
2011 61 2 -6.6 
2015 68 7 0.4 
Mean Avg. 67.6 	 	
*indicates referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.  
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Based on the values for the Canadian national average of voter turnout rate in the federal 
elections examined, as published by Elections Canada, the mean average for voter turnout 
for this time period was 67.6 percent.  
3.3.2 Median Income  
The median income represents the income level of the median citizen of a country, 
area, demographic group, etc. In this paper it is used in the context of the Canadian 
provinces. Each province’s median income for every federal election year was taken and 
is then used to represent the level of income equality throughout the country on a 
provincial basis. Used as a measure of the wealth of the average citizen in absolute terms, 
it is not expected that the median income will give us strong evidence to make any claims 
about relative power theory or conflict theory, but it could provide insight into the 
strength of resource theory. A statistically significant positive coefficient could be 
interpreted as potential proof of resource theory’s presence. 
3.3.3 Gini Coefficient 
The Gini Coefficient (sometimes also referred to as Gini ‘index’) spans from 0 to 1 
and measures the degree to which income is distributing equally throughout a society, 
where 0 would be total equality (everyone holds equal wealth) and 1 would be total 
inequality (one person holds all the wealth). The Gini index spawns out of the Lorenz 
curve which is the graphical representation of the distribution of wealth in a society. On a 
Lorenz graph, the percentage of total wealth is plotted on the y-axis and the percentage of 
total population is plotted in the x-axis. In this context, a perfect 45-degree line would 
represent full equality, the Lorenz curve is then plotted underneath this line and represents 
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the distribution of wealth in a society. The Gini coefficient then measures the area 





The Gini coefficient has been a very useful tool for economists in the study of income 
inequality throughout the world but it is not a perfect measure in itself of income 
inequality. The main critique of the Gini index was pointed out by Antonio Jaime-
Castillo’s paper prepared for the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Conference 
held in Toronto in 2009. The issue with the Gini in this regard is that two completely 
different Lorenz curves can yield the same Gini index value. Thus, the same Gini 
coefficient can reflect inequality between the top and the middle of the income 
distribution, or between the middle and the bottom of the income distribution (Jaime-






apply the Gini as a measure of income inequality and test its relationship to voter turnout 
through the lens of any of the three theories presented in the previous section. Observing 
the same society over time, which is what this paper is doing, could be immune to this 
issue though for the following reason. In the case where Gini decreases due to a decrease 
in income at the top rather than a gain at the bottom, the relative power gained by the 
lower percentile earners would still be substantial under the framework that will be 
proposed in the proceeding sections. A statistically significant positive coefficient could 
be a sign of the presence of conflict theory, while a negative coefficient could be 
interpreted as the presence of relative power theory. 
3.3.4 Income decile ratios 
Taking Jaime-Castillo’s point of advice, this research will not only focus on Gini as a 
measurement of income inequality but will include the following income decile ratios for 
analysis: 
P90/P50 – ratio measure of the inequality at the top of the income ladder. The richest 
decile to the middle income earners. In our dataset it is calculated as the average income 
earned by the top decile divided by the corresponding median income. 
P50/P10 – ratio measure of the inequality at the bottom half of the income ladder. In our 
dataset it is calculated as the median income divided by the average income earned by the 
lowest decile. 
Similar to the Gini coefficient, where an increase to the ratio represents growing 
inequality, a statistically significant positive coefficient in our findings could be evidence 
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for the presence of conflict theory, while a negative coefficient could be evidence for 
relative power theory. 
3.3.5 Median Age  
According to the law of dispersion, as voter turnout decreases and political inequality 
increases, younger voters drop out of the participation at a higher rate than older voters 
(Tingsten, 1937). The empirical evidence supplied by the Swedish study by Persson, 
Solevid, and Öhrvall also found statistically significant results for age having an effect on 
voter turnout. The trends observed in this data show visually that there is a very real 
difference in voter turnout by age, and the fact that the graph represents thirty-five years 
of data should lead one to dispel any preconceived assumptions that the difference in 
voter turnouts by age is due to differences in generational tendencies.  
Figure	3:	Estimated	Voter	Turnout	in	Canada	by	Age	Group,	1965–2000	
 






Based on the above findings, it is expected that the median age will have some 
positive effect on the voter turnout rate since as the median age rises then the average age 
of those voting eligible should also be higher and since older citizens tend to vote more 
(proportionally to younger citizens), this would lead to an increase in the voter turnout 
rates. A statistically significant positive coefficient here would be in line with what is 
stated under the law of dispersion as discussed in the previous section. 
3.3.6 Employment Rate  
One notable variable from the Persson, Solevid, and Öhrvall study presented earlier 
was that of Education Years. The amount of years of education a citizen had had a 
significant effect as a predictor on whether they maintained their desire to vote in the 
second election. This was not a new finding, as it had been supposed that the level of 
Education has always been a strong predictor of political engagement, dating back to 
Tingsten’s findings. Due to this, I decided not to include education level in the models but 
instead took a different approach. Supposing that it may not be purely the level of 
education that is a factor in political engagement, but in fact the ability that the voter has 
to utilize that education manifested as job security. Human capital theory is widely 
accepted as providing an explanation as to how wages are determined, and through 
human capital theory it is shown that the higher level of education, the higher the 
expected wage of the individual.22 Thus, I included the employment rate sorted by highest 





but still face unmet expectations of job security can become alienated from the process 
just the same as those with lower level of education and perhaps lower expectations of job 
security. It may not be the educational level itself, but what the voter is able to get out of 
that education level that determines their will to be politically engaged.  
Employment Rate Total 
The employment rate for all who are 15 years of age or older, as estimated by 
Statistics Canada. Following the logic that being employed generates wages, a simplistic 
way to interpret expectations here would be that if the employment rate is rising, the 
general wealth and job security of the labour force should be rising as well. Under this 
assumption, a statistically significant positive coefficient here could support resource 
theory in this context, and a negative result could be evidence that simply just being 
employed is not a strong enough factor to prevent voters from feeling alienated or 
indifferent from politics. 
Employment Rate by Highest Educational Attainment: 
Did not graduate High School 
The employment rate for those who are 15 years of age or older who have not 
graduated from high school (0-8 years of schooling total), as estimated by Statistics 
Canada 
High School Graduate 
The employment rate for those who are 15 years of age or older whose highest 
educational attainment is completion of high school, as estimated by Statistics Canada 
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Post-Secondary Diploma or Certificate 
The employment rate for those who are 15 years of age or older whose highest 
educational attainment is either a post-secondary diploma or certificate, but not a degree, 
as estimated by Statistics Canada. 
University Graduate (Bachelor’s degree or above) 
The employment rate for those who are 15 years of age or older and have completed 
at least a bachelor’s degree from a university, as estimated by Statistics Canada. 
3.3.7 Closeness of Election Outcome 
Based on the rational choice models of voting presented earlier, the closeness of an 
election could potentially have a strong effect on a voter’s decision to participate. A 
closer election increases the marginal probability value that their vote will have an effect 
on the outcome. A dummy variable was created to control for closeness of the election in 
which 0 was coded for majority government results, and 1 coded for minority government 
results. Under these conditions, it would be expected that a statistically significant 
positive coefficient could be evidence that Canadian voters recognize the increased 
marginal probability of their vote being decisive to the outcome. 
Canada’s electoral system being a multi-partied system can yield two types of 
outcomes for the party which forms the government. There can be either a majority 
government wherein the winning party has successfully been elected to more seats in the 
House of Commons (or applicable provincial legislature) than all the other parties 
combined. Or, there will be a minority government wherein the party with the most seats 
still has less seats than all of the other parties combined, meaning that their margin of 
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victory was smaller than if they had won a majority. Currently, the Liberal Party, led by 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has a majority government won in the 2015 federal 
election, ensuring them a four-year mandate. In a minority government situation however, 
the opposition parties can collectively act together through a vote of “no confidence” and 
force an election call at the permission of the Governor General.23 This is why some 
election years are less than four years apart from their predecessor, such as the span from 
2004-2011 in which four federal elections were held.  
3.3.8 Proportion of Voting Aged Population in Marriage or Common Law 
Relationship 
In the law of dispersion study conducted by Persson, Solevid, and Öhrvall in 
Sweden’s Västra Götaland county, they found that being married had a statistically 
significant positive impact on the likelihood of voting (Persson et al., 2013). Based on 
their results, a similar variable should be included in this paper. For each province, within 
each election year, the estimated proportion of the population living as legally married or 
in a common law relationship was taken and included in to one of the regression models 
to see if the same statistical significant relationship between civil status and political 
participation existed in this context. A statistically significant positive coefficient here 
would provide possible further evidence to the law of dispersion which finds that 








4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
4.1 Income Inequality 
As has been argued previously, income inequality (relative income) will have an 
effect on political participation and thus, the voter turnout rate. Taking all the relevant 
theories presented into account; higher income inequality could increase voter turnout 
through conflict theory, decrease voter turnout through relative power theory, or as 
argued through resource theory, affect participation at the individual level by encouraging 
those with higher incomes and discouraging those with lower incomes. The initial models 
use the Gini coefficient as the measure for income inequality. To explore Jaime-Castillo’s 
call for income decile comparisons instead of Gini with matters related to political 
participation, alternative models using the P90/P50 and P50/P10 ratios are also tested. 
Model 1: Direct Linear Relationship 
Voter Turnout = ƒ (Income Inequality) 
Model 2: Quadratic (Polynomial) Relationship 
Voter Turnout = ƒ (Income Inequality) 
The first editions of the models will test the Gini coefficient as the measure for 
income inequality. Following these tests, alternative tests of income inequality will be 
conducted as follows: 
Models 1A, 1B, and 1C replace the Gini coefficient with the P90P50 ratio, P50P10 
ratio, and median income respectively. 
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Models 2A, 2B, and 2C replace the Gini coefficient with the P90P50 ratio, P50P10 
ratio, and median income respectively. 
4.2 Other socioeconomic factors 
After testing solely for the effect that income inequality has on voter turnout, the 
following socioeconomic indicators were then added to the model to account for other 
factors supported by the literature: age, civil status (proportion married or in common law 
relationship), closeness of election result, and the employment rate. 
Model 3:  
Voter Turnout = ƒ (Income Inequality, Median Age, Marriage or Common Law, 
Employment Rate) 
4.3 Employment rate by education 
After testing the relationship as centred around income inequality, a separate model 
was used to test how the job security provided by education level might also affect 
political participation. As noted earlier, the literature sees a significant relationship 
between education level and political participation. I hypothesize that this may be due to 
the fact that those with higher educational attainment have greater earnings potential and 
job security and so the educational effects previously discovered may be in large part due 
to those individuals being better off from an employment perspective. The employment 
rate was recorded for the previously mentioned four groups and included into the 





Voter Turnout = ƒ (Emp. Rate for < High School, Emp. Rate for High School 
graduates, Emp. Rate for Diploma or Certificate holders, Emp. Rate for 
Bachelor’s Degree or higher) 
4.4 Employment Rate 
Model 5: Quadratic (Polynomial) Relationship 
Voter Turnout = ƒ (Total Employment Rate)  
5. RESULTS 
After originally including the variable that controlled for a result of a majority or 
minority government, it was removed from the model after it was found to be statistically 
insignificant. Upon removing from the model, the R-squared values witnessed increased, 
leading to more efficient models on the whole. Results from the regression analysis are 
presented in the subsequent four tables. 
 Model 1 
P>F = 0.000 
R^2 = .5642 
Model 2 
P>F = 0.000 
R^2 = .5749 
Model 3 
P>F = 0.000 
R^2 = .7209 


















N/A N/A ***-1.209  
(.373) 
*** p < 0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10   No *’s signifies no statistical significance 
Coefficients are in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses 
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When we look at the first model which analyzes the potential linear relationship 
between voter turnout and the Gini coefficient there is a statistically significant negative 
coefficient result indicating an inverse relationship between the Gini and political 
participation. This would be consistent with the relative power theory in which an 
increase in income inequality is hypothesized to deter political participation.  
When a quadratic model is applied to explain the relationship between the Gini and 
political participation the result is statistically significant and quite interesting. Under this 
model, it is shown that up to a point, voter turnout increases as the Gini increases. In other 
words, as income distribution becomes more unequal, voter turnout is increasing which 
would support the hypothesis of the conflict theory. After a certain point however, we see 
that the relationship changes to a negative one as the Gini continues to increase. This 
result would seem to indicate that both theories are shown to be in effect but that they are 
not constant and that their effect depends on the level of inequality itself. 
Under the third model, the other hypothesized socioeconomic determinants of political 
participation are included into the model and the results remain statistically significant. In 
addition to the Gini coefficient’s relationship, it is observed that both age and marriage or 
common law partnerships are positively related to political participation, as was 
hypothesized. A surprising result though is the finding that the total employment rate has 
a negative relationship with political participation in this case. 
As noted in previous sections of this paper, other measures of income inequality 
outside of the Gini coefficient were included in order to provide greater context to both 
the issue and whether the Gini coefficient itself was an adequate measure. In the 
alternatives to the first three models in which the Gini coefficient was replaced by other 
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measures of income inequality, only the following models held any statistical significance 
with the data.  
 Model 1C 
P>F = 0.0000 
R^2 = .4286 
Model 2B 
P>F = 0.0000 
R^2 = .4624 
Model 3B 
P>F = 0.0000 
R^2 = .7252 
P50P10 N/A ***26.74963 
(5.44) 
**13.69186  
      (6.369) 
P50P10 ^2 N/A ***-3.174257 
(.612) 
**-1.594639  
     (.7042) 
Median 
Income 
***-.5651169     
(.17699) 
N/A N/A 










N/A N/A ***-1.218675 
(.3446) 
*** p < 0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10   No *’s signifies no statistical significance 
Coefficients are in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
In the variation of Model 1 where median income’s direct linear relationship with 
political participation was tested, the result is statistically significant but yields a very 
small coefficient. Put into the context of the units of the variables, it is indicating that as 
median income increases by $1000, the voter turnout is declining at an average rate of 
0.565 percent. 
Under the variation of Model 2 which replaces the Gini coefficient with the P50P10 
ratio, a similar relationship to the original model is observed. As the inequality between 
the median income and the average lowest decile income grows, political participation is 
increasing up to a point where then the relationship turns negative. The R-squared value 
in the alternative model is lower than that of the original model which would not be 
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surprising since the Gini measures total inequality, while the P50P10 ratio is only 
examining the inequality between half of the population.  
The third Model’s variation offers very similar results to the original model. The R-
squared value is almost identical between the two models, the relationship between the 
income inequality variable and the political participation variable holds as was observed 
under the previous model, and the factors of age, marriage or common law relationships, 
and the total employment rate all exhibit the same relationships to political participation. 
The following two models shift the focus from the effect of income inequality on 
political participation to that of the employment rate. As hypothesized earlier in this 
paper, the effect that the education level present in a society has on political participation 
is not solely due to the education itself, but due to the job security and/or higher earnings 
that come with greater education relative to other participants in the labour market. 
Results from this test are presented below: 
Employment Rates by Highest 
Educational Attainment 
Model 4 
P>F = 0.0000 
R^2 = 0.7347 
Did not graduate High School ***.6645575 
 (.1922) 
High School graduate -.031909  
(.2318) 




Bachelor’s degree or higher -.1146661  
(.0129) 
*** p < 0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10   No *’s signifies no statistical significance 
Coefficients are in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses 
The model did yield a fairly high R-squared value, but only two of the four variables in 
the test showed statistical significance. The surprising result being that the relationship 
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between the employment rate for those of whom held a post-secondary diploma or 
certificate came back negative and that interpreting the coefficient in the context of the 
units of the model; it is suggesting that on average, as the employment rate for the group 
increases by one percentage point, the voter turnout rate declines by 1.98 percentage 
points. The results of this model should be interpreted cautiously though due to the 
inconsistency in the statistical significance of all of the coefficients.  
The final model tested examines purely just the relationship between the total 
employment rate and political participation. It is expected that the employment rate would 
have a positive relationship with political participation since higher levels of employment 
theoretically results in higher income levels, higher stakes in politics through labour 
policies, if more people are employed and have job security then they have more to lose 
with a potential unwanted change of government, and that when the employment rate 
decreases people will be angry and motivated to create a change in government. 
 Model 5 
P>F = 0.0000 
R^2 = 0.6705 
Employment Rate Total ***4.214117 
 (1.464) 
Employment Rate Total ^2 ***-.0446215  
(.0129) 
*** p < 0.01  **p<0.05  *p<0.10   No *’s signifies no statistical significance 
Coefficients are in bold, robust standard errors in parentheses 
The results of this test are found to be statistically significant and are also quite 
interesting. Using a quadratic model, the employment rate is positively related to political 
participation up to a certain point, at which it seems to level off and begin a slight decline. 
If this result is reflective of true voter behaviour, it is suggesting that as the employment 
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rate for all is increasing, voter turnout is also increasing, but at some level of employment 
the employment rate’s effect on political participation weakens and might actually begin 
to work against political participation. This result, as well as the results in the previous 
three tables provide interesting discussion points which will be explored in the concluding 
section of this paper. 
6. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper is threefold: firstly, to examine if there is evidence at the 
aggregate level to support or disprove the presence of the law of dispersion across 
Canada’s political environment. Secondly, to test for evidence that speaks to whether any 
of the relative power, conflict, or resource theories related to inequality and political 
participation can be argued for or against. Thirdly, to raise the profile of the issue of 
socioeconomic factors’ relationship with political participation and show that they are 
interacting with each other and not separate entities, determined exogenously of the other. 
Or in other words, that if they exhibit complex interactive behaviour, gaps in 
socioeconomic inequalities cannot be sought to be effectively closed without taking into 
account how vital political participation is. 
Based on the methods employed in this study, there is strong evidence to support that 
all of relative power, conflict, and resource theories are present and that one does not 
necessarily trump the other, but that the conditions of inequality determine which theory 
holds true. Results related to both the Gini coefficient and P50P10 ratio show that 
increasing inequality encourages voter turnout but that as inequality continues to increase 
the response of voter turnout flattens and then turns negative. This leads us to conclude 
that conflict theory is relevant in this context at the initial stages where participants 
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initially feel income inequality’s effects, but that as income inequality pushes higher it is 
relative power theory that then is becoming dominant over conflict theory. 
As a whole, the statistically significant results observed in both Models 3 and 3B 
point to evidence of the law of dispersion being present across Canada in federal 
elections. Income inequality, age, and civil status all became significant predictors of 
voter turnout rates in a way that suggests that as turnout declines, it is the registered 
voters who tend to be younger, single, and hold relatively less wealth who withdraw from 
the political sphere. 
Education factors were tested in the context of employment rates experienced by 
educational attainment group and the results are mixed and could point to the need to 
examine this issue with greater detail and with better data. Only two of the four groups 
came back with statistically significant results in the model designed here. An interesting 
interpretation can be gathered from the fact that the employment rate of those with less 
education was positively related to voter turnout while the employment rate for those who 
had a diploma or certificate was negatively related. This could be pointing to the 
possibility that as voters gain education and increase their human capital, factors outside 
of employment security are influencing their perspective on political participation. The 
lack of statistically significant results for all independent variables in this case precludes 
me from making any significant conclusions other than to encourage further review, 
study, and analysis of this relationship in future studies. 
The statistically significant result in Model 5 of the relationship between voter turnout 
and the total employment rate could be giving evidence of the effects present under 
resource theory. As employment is growing, it is assumed that the greater resources 
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amongst the population is growing which under resource theory would encourage greater 
political participation. However, we notice that this relationship is not purely a direct 
linear one. The effect that the total employment rate has on voter turnout diminishes, 
flattens out at a point, and then reverses to a negative impact.  
Overall, we can conclude that the socioeconomic factors of income inequality, age, 
and marital or common law status are significant predictors of political participation as 
measured by voter turnout amongst the registered voting base in Canada, across all 
provinces. We can also conclude that the employment rate for all working age Canadians 
is a significant factor as well. However, these relationships are perhaps not as simplistic 
as originally thought. Income inequality affects political participation in different ways 
dependent upon its severity. When it is low, gains to inequality increase political 
participation, but when it is higher, further gains to inequality decrease political 
participation. Potentially, this could be happening due to the fact that political 
participation is increasing, yet income inequality is also still increasing. Participants may 
be observing that their own participation in the system is not closing the income 
inequalities present. In fact, they are witnessing having either no effect, or a negative 
effect, and therefore choose to withdraw due to their perceived benefits not being realized 
and/or they grow fatigued by the process.  
The employment rate also exhibits a similar relationship as income inequality, 
suggesting that when the employment rate is lower, gains in employment increase 
political participation, but as employment sees further gains, its effects on political 
participation are withdrawing and/or being reversed. This could be evidence of 
employment itself being an important factor, but as employment gains are met, other 
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Labrador	 56.84	 -10.76	 0.3288	
P.E.I.	 75.61	 8.01	 0.2968	
Nova	Scotia	 67.69	 0.09	 0.3196	
New	Brunswick	 70.38	 2.78	 0.3166	
Quebec	 68.83	 1.23	 0.3313	
Ontario	 67.85	 0.25	 0.3392	
Manitoba	 66.15	 -1.45	 0.3296	
Saskatchewan	 68.31	 0.71	 0.3402	
Alberta	 63.62	 -3.98	 0.3405	
B.C.	 68.69	 1.09	 0.3343	
	    
Canada	 67.6	 	  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
24	Calculated	from	data	provided	by	Elections	Canada	at	
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?dir=his&document=appx&lang=e&section=res	
	
25	Calculated	from	data	provided	by	Statistics	Canada	Table	206-0033	
